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The validity of 
the State-as-planner 
in the current 
crisis 
Adolfo Gurrieri* 
The State has always been dealt with in a somewhat 
paradoxical manner in the writings of ECLAC; it is 
regarded as a decisive agent in the formulation and 
application of development strategies, but its true, 
changeable, nature is not analysed in depth. This 
paradox has been resolved by assuming the existence 
of an ideal planning and reformist State which would 
fully perform the function assigned to it. Taking this 
paradox as his starting point, the author's object in 
this article is to describe the way in which the topic of 
the State has been dealt with by ECLAC, to point out 
some of the criticisms which have been made of it, 
and to outline the way in which this subject should be 
reformulated in the light of the current political 
conditions in the region and the requirements of a 
strategy for achieving autonomous, equitable and 
democratic development. 
In this last connection, the author explores the 
important political issue relating to the role which 
the State should play in the current crisis, arguing 
that there is no single position that might be chosen 
on the basis of purely technical criteria. Instead, the 
possible ways of resolving this issue revolve around 
three main political formulas (liberal, State and 
democratic) whose content the author analyses and 
compares. Finally, in relation to the type of State 
seen as being desirable, two basic propositions are 
developed: the need to strengthen the State appara-
tus, and the need to establish and consolidate demo-
cratic forms of political organization. 
"Director of the Social Development Division of 
ECLAC. The author wishes to express his appreciation for 
the comments made by Aníbal Pinto and Pedro Sainz. 
I 
The role of the State 
as viewed by ECLAC 
1. The original concepts 
ECLAC originally conceived of the State as play-
ing the role of the main agent of development, in 
large measure as a result of the failings which it 
had detected in private economic agents and in 
the market as a mechanism. Its casting of the 
State in this role was not the outgrowth of its 
application of doctrinary principles; on the con-
trary, as is also true of the development pro-
gramme it proposed at the time, this was above 
all a response to the consequences of the crisis of 
the 1930s in Latin America (Prebisch, 1951 and 
1954). 
This crisis drove ECLAC to question the 
pattern of development which the countries of 
the region had been following, as well as the 
institutional foundations of the national and 
international economic order which has been its 
basis'.1 To say that ECLAC questioned these foun-
dations is not to say that it rejected them, but 
only that it was not bowing to the doctrinary 
influence of the centres and accepting them 
uncritically. They had to be evaluated in order to 
determine whether they could serve as a support 
for the peripheral economies which were endea-
vouring to change their development pattern. 
The ECLAC documents of the period do not 
set forth a systematic analysis of these institu-
tional foundations; perhaps their controversial 
nature hindered an open discussion of them. In 
any event, the scattered references made to them 
lln very general terms, the main institutional foundations of 
u capitalist market economy are the private ownership of capital, 
the private management of commercial enterprises, the private 
appropriation of profits, competition, the price system as a basic 
guide for economic agents, the free availability of the factors of 
production and, at the international level, the free circulation of 
goods and factors. It will be helpful to bear this list of institutional 
foundations in mind (the first three of which correspond to the 
capitalist aspect of the concept, while the rest correspond to the 
market aspect), since ¡t can be used as a guideline for clarifying the 
intensity and scope of the types of State intervention characteriz-
ing the various hybrid forms of economic organization (both 
theoretical and practical), such as that proposed by IÍC1.AC in its 
early days. 
194 CEPAL REVIEW No. 31 / April 1987 
can be used to reconstruct an outline of the 
institutional order which ECLAC considered 
desirable and the role which it saw the State 
fulfilling within it (Rodriguez, 1980; Gurrieri, 
1982b). 
The picture sketched by ECLAC in these 
areas is ambivalent, however. On the one hand, 
it underscored the importance of the dynamism 
and creativity which spring from individual 
efforts prompted by private interest and of the 
greater economic efficiency made possible by the 
private management of enterprises. On the 
other hand, it pointed out the weaknesses of 
some of these foundations as an effective basis 
for the decisions and tasks required for 
development. 
The main weaknesses were associated with 
some of the characteristics of private economic 
agents and the market. These agents often do 
not have the necessary resources and drive to 
carry forward the tasks required for develop-
ment but, even more importantly, they lack the 
global perspective they would need in order to 
take the most appropriate decisions. Attaining 
such a global perspective involves passing 
beyond the bounds of a viewpoint ruled by the 
interests of the individual enterprise and taking 
into consideration such aspects as, inter alia, the 
relations among the various sectors of the 
national economic structure, external economic 
relations, the social and political repercussions 
of economic decisions, and appropriate techno-
logical changes, all of which must also be seen 
within the context of an extended time frame. 
Moreover, this weakness on the part of pri-
vate economic agents cannot be made up for by 
market mechanisms, whose signals do not 
reflect the above aspects either, since they are no 
more than a reflection of the effective demand of 
these same agents. The sum of these individual 
rationalities does not equal a global rationality. 
Furthermore, the peripheral economies must 
control and re-direct international market sti-
muli since, if these stimuli were to be given free 
rein, the economies would then only replicate an 
economic structure whose flaws have already 
been revealed by the crisis. Development will 
not be achieved through the spontaneous action 
of market forces, but rather as a result of the 
deliberate efforts of the whole of society, guided 
by the State. 
These shortcomings were what justified and, 
at the same time, oriented and delimited the type 
of State intervention proposed by ECLAC during 
those early years. Generally speaking, State 
intervention was envisioned as being as broad-
based and intensive as it was because of the 
requirements of the proposed development pro-
gramme and the weakness of private agents and 
the market in regard to its implementation. 
ECLAC saw State intervention as being 
necessary in many economic spheres, but some 
of them are especially important: firstly, system-
atically structuring the long-term global vision 
referred to above into a plan aimed at transform-
ing the structure left as a legacy from the 
outward-oriented development pattern into a 
modern industrial economy; secondly, taking 
direct action in the crucial areas of this plan, 
including the encouragement of capital accumu-
lation by raising the coefficient of internal sav-
ings and attracting and channelling external 
resources, the protection and promotion of 
industrialization, the diminishment of external 
vulnerability, the creation of infrastructure, and 
the encouragement and orientation of techno-
logical change; and thirdly, in close relation to 
the preceding two courses of action, the preven-
tion and control of the various types of economic 
disequilibria inevitably brought on by a structu-
ral transformation such as that provided for in 
the above type of plan. 
Thus, State intervention was to be broad-
based and intensive, if it is judged by the doctri-
nary precepts prevalent at the time in Latin 
America, but it would be a mistake to suppose 
that ECLAC was in favour of its expansion to the 
point where it would suffocate private economic 
agents or the mechanism of the market. The 
ideal situation, in its view, was instead to strike a 
balance between the public and private sectors, 
between the State and the market, which would 
highlight the positive aspects of each, facilitate 
their complementarity and avoid the adverse 
consequences of too great a predominance of any 
one of these agents over the others. This equili-
brium would be the expression of an institu-
tional framework that combined the basic 
foundations of a capitalist market economy with 
the necessary measure of State intervention. In 
the particular combination originally proposed 
by ECLAC, State intervention would be directed 
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much more towards complementing, supple-
menting and sustaining such features than 
towards attempting to make radical changes in 
them. In other words, it was felt that State 
intervention should stimulate private activity 
whenever possible and take its place only when 
it was unavoidable. In short, it was proposing a 
State-as-planner which, guided by the develop-
ment plan and relying upon monetary, fiscal, 
exchange and tariff instruments, would direct 
the economic activity of society as a whole; the 
direct execution of this activity, however, should 
preferably and primarily remain in private 
hands. The end result of this process ought to be 
a mutual strengthening of the private economy 
and the State. 
In the early 1960s, ECLAC began to make a 
number of changes in its original programme 
whose result was to further broaden and 
deepened the economic and social role of the 
State. Two of the main changes were the need 
for structural reforms (which were intended to 
boost the accumulation of capital, channel the 
use of this capital appropriately, distribute 
wealth more equitably and promote production) 
and for policies directly aimed at redistributing 
the fruits of economic progress. In both cases, 
the State was to play an important role, expand-
ing its intervention to include the redistribution 
of the means of production (in cases where the 
inefficient management of private enterprises 
made this advisable, such as in the agrarian 
structure) and of income, with a view to mitigat-
ing social inequality and the social and political 
problems which it caused. 
From the 1970s to the present, further 
changes have been made in the overall proposals 
of ECLAC, but they have not significantly altered 
the original concept of the State's role or the 
combination of public and private elements 
which has been the basis of the institutional 
order seen as being desirable. 
2. The State-as-organizer 
and Keynesianism 
In working out its thinking concerning the role 
of the State, ECLAC drew upon the theories and 
experiences of the centres, but had to modify 
them in order to adapt them to the situation of 
the peripheral countries. From the 1930s 
onwards, the predominant historical trends in 
the centres have revolved around the formation 
of the welfare State or the social State of law; at 
the theoretical level, these tendencies are exem-
plified by the proposal of the "State-as-
organizer" (Myrdal, 1957) and the forms of State 
intervention linked to Keynesian thinking. 
In quickly reviewing the history of these 
trends, it should be borne in mind that those who 
originally wielded State power proposed to order 
society in accordance with their criteria and 
interests; the archetypes of this viewpoint were 
the "absolute State" and the establishment of an 
economy organized to serve the interests of State 
power (mercantilism). However, the very eco-
nomic expansion which the order imposed by 
the absolute State made possible and which it 
needed for its own maintenance and growth, 
diversified the nuclei of non-State power, which 
reacted against absolutism. This reaction was 
manifested, in particular, in the liberal economic 
doctrine, which espoused the subordination of 
State power to the criteria, interests and powers 
of the economic organization, and in the liberal/ 
democratic political doctrine, which proposed 
the dissolution of absolutism on the basis of the 
sovereignty of the law and the expansion of civil 
and political rights (Tilly, 1975; Neumann, 
1968). 
The consolidation of the liberal and demo-
cratic trends which, to a greater or lesser degree, 
took place in the various societies in question 
had the effect of multiplying the internal centres 
of power; in all the societies in which these 
processes were present, power structures 
became increasingly complex and, within them, 
heterogeneous nuclei of power of various origins 
exerted influence in many spheres of society. 
Furthermore, this increase in complexity was 
occurring in societies which, largely due to these 
same processes, had reached a high degree of 
economic interdependence and political 
integration. 
This multiplication of the centres of power 
and the conflicts which arose among them 
brought the issue of the "order" once again to the 
fore, an issue which the absolute State had 
attempted to resolve through a heavy reliance on 
coercion; but this issue takes on a different cast 
in highly integrated and interdependent socie-
ties containing a multitude of power nuclei 
(especially economic and political nuclei) apart 
from State power. This order is established, in 
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principle, through the mechanism of the market 
and representative democratic institutions. The 
economic and political crises of the early part of 
the century revealed the need to compensate for 
the weaknesses of the market as a mechanism 
and to expand and consolidate democratic insti-
tutions. This is the problem which theState-as-
organizer attempts to resolve by harmonizing 
conflicting interests and co-ordinating the action 
of the various parts of society in the pursuance of 
a collective purpose. To this end, the State needs 
to regain a larger portion of the power dispersed 
within society, establish institutional mecha-
nisms of conflict resolution which are suited to 
societies in which there is a high degree of eco-
nomic diversification and political participation 
and, above all, be able to orient and co-ordinate 
collective action. 
The model for State intervention in the 
economy was provided by Keynesian thinking. 
In summary Keynesian thought maintains that 
the capitalist market system does not spontane-
ously establish a volume of production which 
will allow full employment, and it therefore pro-
poses that the State should supplement this 
volume by using fiscal and monetary policies to 
regulate effective demand. Once this volume of 
production has been attained through the com-
pensatory and regulatory action of the State, the 
mechanisms of the capitalist market economy 
can determine what is to be produced, how it is to 
be produced, and how the value of the final 
product is to be distributed among the factors of 
production (although in this last regard the State 
as a regulatory and compensatory factor once 
again comes into play). 
3. The peripheral State 
When the issue of State intervention came under 
discussion in Latin America as a consequence of 
the crisis of 1929 and the Second World War, it 
was seen that the problems stemming from this 
crisis were not the only ones with which these 
societies were faced. In addition, their agenda 
also included, as noted by ECLAC, the need to 
change their pattern of economic growth; it was 
not a question of promoting the expansion of an 
existing system, but rather of creating a new one, 
and this called for new economic agents, with 
different capabilities and potentials, and new 
material means. 
Furthermore, the question of national inte-
gration had not been resolved by the previous 
pattern of development either; on the contrary, 
the external appendant linkages of some eco-
nomic areas and sectors had only heightened the 
heterogeneity of the economic and social struc-
ture. Actually, the countries needed to promote 
social as well as physical and economic integra-
tion, inasmuch as there were large segments of 
the population which did not regard themselves 
as members of the society in which they lived. In 
short, these societies were faced with the task of 
building the nation so that they could become 
true national States (Anderson, 1967; Oszlak, 
1982). 
The political aspects of constructing a nation 
are also related to democratization. As noted 
above, many countries urgently needed to under-
take the political task of transforming all their 
inhabitants into citizens, but they, like the socie-
ties of the centres, also had to harmonize con-
flicting interests. Thus this was really a twofold 
task. On the one hand, the politically marginal-
ized sectors of the population had to be incorpo-
rated and, on the other hand, the conflicts among 
those who were already participating politically 
in society had to be harmonized. This task was 
not successfully carried out in all cases, as 
attested to by the political instability of the 
region. 
In addition to all of this, there were the 
problems associated with the peripheral nature 
of the Latin American societies. Due to this 
peripheral status, the State was subject to "exter-
nal" factors which had a significant effect on its 
decisions and performance, both because of 
these societies' position and function in the 
international economic structure and because of 
the presence of major internal nuclei of power 
whose decisions were guided by external ele-
ments. Consequently, the State had to overcome 
this peripheral situation and attempt to put 
itself on an equal footing with the States on 
which it was dependent. 
In sum, the crisis of the outward-oriented 
growth model revealed the extent of the chal-
lenges which the Latin American societies and 
States had before them. These challenges had 
been confronted in the centres over a much 
longer period of time and, because of this, these 
problems had come about gradually. In the Latin 
American countries, however, the problems are 
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superimposed upon each other —although in 
different ways in the various countries— creat-
ing a picture of superimposed, heterogeneous 
layers. 
Given this agenda of problems which the 
Latin American societies had to address, and 
given the State as a key agent in this process, the 
models of the welfare State and the forms of 
Keynesian intervention were patently insuffi-
cient. The role of the State in Latin America had 
to be broader and more intensive than in the 
central countries because, even though the latter 
were in the midst of a serious crisis, they 
nonetheless did not have to deal with the trans-
formation of their growth pattern, the economic 
and political integration of strikingly hetero-
geneous structures, or the productive absorption 
of large segments of the population that were 
engaged in pre-capitalist modes of production. 
The State-as-planner as characterized by 
ECLAC was seen as undertaking a greater degree 
of intervention than that suggested by the 
Keynesian model because its objectives were not 
confined to guaranteeing full employment, stim-
ulating economic growth (how much to pro-
duce) and ensuring a more equitable distribution 
of Income (how to distribute), but also included 
restructuring the economy for industrialization 
(what to produce), orienting the utilization of 
the factors of production in accordance with 
their availability (how to produce), and accom-
plishing all this from a peripheral position 
which made it necessary to exercise a much 
firmer control over external economic relations 
and their impacts. The main focus of Keynesian-
ism is on supplementing private activity by 
means of regulatory activity directed primarily at 
stabilizing the economy in the short term; 
ECLAC proposed that the State itself should take 
the initiative —due to the absence of a number of 
important private agents— in attempting to 
bring about changes aimed at restructuring and 
developing the economy over the long term. 
Both schools of thought attribute importance to 
the "indirect" activity of the State, i.e., the use of 
conventional policy tools to influence the 
"direct" activity of private agents. However, 
Keynesianism has only occasionally (e.g., in the 
final pages of its "general theory") supported 
the position taken by ECLAC in advocating a key 
and "direct" role for the State in the accumula-
tion of capital when the objective is to promote 
long-term growth. 
If the thinking of ECLAC concerning the role 
of the State is considered against the backdrop of 
the historical experience of the central countries, 
the results are enlightening: the problems which 
ECLAC believed the Latin American States 
should address have also figured —except in 
those aspects related to a peripheral position— 
in the agenda of the central States at some point 
in their evolution. The only difference —and it is 
an important one— is that the central States 
have dealt with these problems over the lengthy 
period of time stretching between absolutism 
and the present day, whereas the Latin American 
States have to deal with all of them at the same 
time and within a much shorter period. Thus, in 
the light of the centres' experiences and theories 
and of the needs of the Latin American societies, 
ECLAC correctly identified the key items at that 
point in time on the agenda of tasks which the 
Latin American States should address; an agenda 
whose importance and timeliness have been 
reinforced by today's crisis. However, ECLAC did 
not ask itself, at the time, whether the Latin 
American States were up to these tasks, if they 
could carry them out successfully. 
II 
Criticism of the ECLAC concept of the State 
1. The nature of the State 
Although the State was seen as playing a central 
role in the development programme, little was 
done during the early years of ECLAC to investi-
gate its nature and its actual capacity for carrying 
out the tasks assigned to it. Even though the 
formulation and application of the development 
programme demanded, as a minimum condition, 
the pre-existence of a State having specific char-
acteristics, the question of whether or not such a 
State existed was not raised as a central issue, at 
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least explicitly. As a result, ECLAC's ideas regard-
ing the nature of the State remained, to a great 
degree, tacit ones. 
Nonetheless, the general lines of these 
implicit ideas can be easily reconstructed. The 
State was regarded as an economic agent which 
interacted with other individual and collective 
agents both within and beyond the national 
society. It was, however, a multi-faceted agent, 
because it was represented by all those who occu-
pied positions within the State apparatus; 
among these, two of the major actors were "poli-
ticians" and "technical experts". 
The main features of this many-sided agent, 
which were required for its effective action and, 
at the same time, were assumed as a given, were 
the following: 
a) Internal unity and consistency of the various 
agents representing the State, under the 
authority of government leaders; 
b) Autonomy from other agents, which 
allowed it to override the one-sided and sec-
toral viewpoints of such agents and to 
develop an overall vision (plan) that super-
seded them and expressed the general inter-
ests of the national community; 
c) Political and economic power, which it used 
to impose its views upon the other agents, 
either in the form of orders given by virtue 
of its political authority or in the form of 
influence exerted through economic policy 
instruments and the resources controlled by 
the State; 
d) Techno-administrative and managerial 
capacity to carry forward the proposed pro-
gramme efficiently; 
e) Control over external economic relations of 
the same sort which all States exercise over 
domestic political relations. 
One might say that, according to the original 
ECLAC thinking on the subject, the State was 
perceived as a conductor who defended the auto-
nomy and liberty of the musicians in the orches-
tra but who also brought various types of 
influence to bear on them in order to ensure that 
they would play the scores he had composed. In 
addition, ECLAC's emphasis on the role of the 
State stemmed from a concept of political action 
in which a technical rationality played a decisive 
part; the State was to be the one which formu-
lated this rationality and put it into practice by 
means of the development plan and the instru-
ment of planning. 
2. Some dimensions of self-criticism 
Among the most persistent criticisms which 
have been made of ECLAC's concept of the State, 
the first that might be mentioned is the criticism 
made by the liberal school of thought; as is well 
known, this doctrine criticizes all State interven-
tion except that which is designed to sustain and 
expand the capitalist market economy. In the 
liberal view, the State cannot be the agent which 
elaborates and applies a general technical ration-
ality; this task must be the spontaneous result of 
the activity of private agents and the market. It 
contends that the State, by virtue of its very 
nature, tends to limit the freedom of private 
economic agents and easily falls into the errors 
of inefficiency and corruption. Therefore, this 
school of thought does not advocate the expan-
sion of the States intervention, but instead 
argues for its control with a view to ensuring 
that it performs its functions in a way which is 
suited to private economic interests (the "subsi-
diary State"). 
The liberal line of reasoning cannot be cri-
tiqued in the space of a few lines; nevertheless, 
two important flaws should be pointed out. 
Firstly, those belonging to this school wish to 
control the power emanating from the State, but 
devote much less attention to the concentration 
of economic and political power in private 
hands. Secondly, in recent years the anti-State 
principles of liberalism have been used in both 
the centre and the periphery to dismantle the 
State structures and functions which had come 
into being as a result of efforts to build more 
democratic and equitable societies. In effect, it 
has committed the error of failing to distinguish 
between State intervention aimed at consolidat-
ing authoritarian and oligarchic approaches, on 
the one hand, and those designed to expand 
democracy and make it more equitable, on the 
other (Gurrieri, 1982b). 
In view of these and other weaknesses men-
tioned earlier, liberal political thinking does not 
represent a theoretical option which could be 
used in the place of the one developed by ECLAC; 
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to the contrary, its excessive reliance on the 
virtues of the market compounds the inadequacy 
of its view of the importance of prívate power 
and of the nature of State interventions. 
Nonetheless, ECLAC itself was not content with 
its analysis of the State and therefore proceeded 
to take another hard and critical look at the 
subject. 
As ECLAC developed its thinking in this 
area, it came under fire from two different 
directions within the organization in the mid-
1960s: sociological analysis and the reflections 
prompted by the so-called "planning crisis". 
Sociological analysis in ECLAC has always 
been directed towards the search for an "inte-
grated focus" on development, and this search 
rapidly led it to the structures of power. If the 
changeable history of economic and political 
processes are studied, they are seen to be the 
result of conflicts and alliances among social 
classes and groups; the economic and political 
"patterns" or "styles" which take root are the 
manifestation of structures of domination which 
have survived long enough to steer these pro-
cesses along a stable course (Cardoso and Faletto, 
1969)- If development is analysed as a product of 
collective action, then questions arise as to the 
identity of the economic and political "agents" 
which would attempt and succeed in formulating 
it and carrying it out (Medina, 1963). From both 
vantage points —as an historical analysis and as 
a programme of action— sociology found itself 
headed in the direction of the issue of power: its 
main nuclei, its distribution in society, its various 
manifestations (economic, political, cultural, 
etc.). Nevertheless, this effort did not result in a 
more detailed examination of the State appara-
tus and its activities because attention was 
centred on the social forces which were thought 
to shape the structure and orientation of the 
State. In other words, much more attention was 
devoted to the State as a system of domination 
than to the State as an apparatus, to the social 
and political forces struggling to control its insti-
tutional structure than to its configuration and 
functioning. 
The ideas that arose out of analyses of the 
so-called "planning crisis" had an outcome 
which complemented that of the sociological 
criticism. The exploration of the difficulties 
which had been encountered in applying devel-
opment plans once again brought up the pheno-
menon of power, although in this case it referred 
more directly to the State apparatus (Boeninger, 
1976; Matus, 1972 and 1980; ILPES, 1973 and 
1974). It was seen that this apparatus did not 
have the unity and consistency which it had been 
assumed to have and that, instead, it was an 
extremely complex structure where, in the midst 
of a task of growing proportions, a multitude of 
actors were striving to assert their interests and 
were turning to various resources of power in 
order to do so. Furthermore, the direction of 
State action was not usually determined by an 
autonomous and imperative application of its 
technical rationality, but instead by complicated 
decision-making processes involving the inter-
action of nuclei of State and private power in 
which the technical rationality became inter-
mixed with political and bureaucratic rationali-
ties (Medina, 1972). The techno-administrative 
and managerial efficiency of the State could not 
be regarded as a given ¡n this situation; on the 
contrary, it constituted a quite difficult problem 
to resolve. Finally, the State's control over exter-
nal economic relations was seen to be increas-
ingly limited in an international economy which 
was rapidly becoming transnationalized. 
In the light of these criticisms, a different 
image began to be formed of the nature of the 
State, of politics and of planning and, hence, of 
the way in which development plans should be 
designed and executed. In other words, it became 
necessary to change the "political formula" 
which ECLAC had used during an extended 
period of time in addressing the political prob-
lems of development. The concept of the politi-
cal process as one in which a single actor (the 
State) exerted an overriding influence had to 
give way to a different concept in which many 
actors, drawing upon a varied range of power 
resources, influenced decision-making; and the 
State was not necessarily the most powerful 
among them. The supposedly external State 
which was superimposed upon society had, 
instead, to be thought of as a part of society 
—generally a central and decisive part, but 
nonetheless inextricably bound to it. The duality 
of State and society in which the State occupied a 
dominant position had to be replaced by a view 
in which the two constituted a close partnership; 
the vision of a unified and consistent State had to 
be put aside in favour of a perspective in which 
the State was many-sided and often inconsistent; 
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the State seen as subject to a higher overall 
rationality had to cede its place to a State in 
which particular and sectoral rationalities deriv-
ing from its heterogeneous apparatus prevailed. 
The clear separation of the economy and politics, 
with the former being regarded as the domain of 
a technical rationality as opposed to the sup-
posed arbitrariness and "non-scientific" nature 
of the latter, had to be abandoned for a perspec-
tive in which techno-economic, political and 
bureaucratic rationalities were placed at the ser-
vice of a planning process directed by a substan-
tive rationality arising out of the very core of the 
society itself. 
This body of criticism was sufficiently sound 
and incisive to have a through-going impact on 
the conventional framework within which 
ECLAC had explored political issues in general 
and the State in particular. However, it did not, 
in principle, alter the development programmes 
proposed by ECLAC. To characterize the issue as 
it was viewed by ECLAC, the crucial question 
was: How were the strategies aimed at develop-
ment, autonomy, equity and democracy to be 
formulated and executed without the support of 
the ¡deal States which had always been assumed 
to exist but, instead, on the basis of the societies 
and States which actually did exist? 
3. Other criticisms 
There have also been other criticisms made, 
however, which have given rise to the view that 
it would be either mistaken or illusory to insti-
tute strategies involving radical change, given 
the actual characteristics of the State and the 
political process (Canak, 1984). 
One such viewpoint (which is situated to the 
right in the doctrinal spectrum) emphasizes that 
the idea of a State-as-planner making large-scale 
transformations involves a misconception of 
social reality and of the changes to which it can 
be subjected. There are two factors which, in this 
view, would limit the action of such a State. 
Firstly, the limited understanding it has of social 
reality narrows the scope of the technical ration-
ality on which it intends to base its action. 
Secondly, most political decisions generate con-
flicts which end up modifying the results of State 
action. If the State, in taking action, were to 
overlook both of these factors, it might well 
make mistakes and provoke conflicts which 
would upset and distort the ends that it had 
originally set out to achieve. Therefore, it is 
argued, an intelligently-directed State should not 
embark upon a radical and broad plan of action 
but instead should undertake a limited form of 
social engineering which would keep conflicts 
and errors to a minimum. Furthermore, the ends 
and the means of this limited action should be 
adapted step by step so as to take into account the 
actual effects it produces as this process unfolds 
(Oszlak, 1980). 
There is no question about the fact that this 
doctrinary position points up important aspects 
of the political decision-making process, but it 
suffers from a basic flaw in that it is not com-
mensurate with the major political dilemmas 
facing the countries of the region. These dilem-
mas, and the decisions relating to them, involve 
sweeping changes which are not the product of 
exaggerated revolutionary zeal but rather of the 
crossroads of history. What must be found is a 
course of action through which the State, with-
out either being naive or arrogantly believing 
itself omnipotent or omniscient, can carry for-
ward the tasks it must perform. 
Another viewpoint (this one being to the 
left of the doctrinal spectrum by virtue of its 
neo-Marxist origins) is that the State in the 
Latin American countries should invariably be 
regarded as part of a dependent capitalist society 
and that this identity necessarily entails func-
tions and restrictions which have a decisive 
impact on the actions it can carry out. The State 
in a capitalist society is thus seen, always and 
inevitably, as a capitalist State. The State appara-
tus may succeed in gaining a certain degree of 
autonomy from the capitalist society whose 
order it is assumed to guarantee and organize, 
but its autonomy will always be limited and con-
flictive if it opposes the nuclei of power whose 
interests coincide with this type of economic and 
social organization or if it runs counter to the 
principles upon which it itself is based. These 
limitations, according to this view, were brought 
out by the crisis of the Latin American reformist 
régimes which were attempting to stimulate 
economic growth and social change by means of 
solutions that were "ambiguous" from the stand-
point of capitalism. If economic growth is to be 
furthered within a system of this type, it is 
argued, then its principles of accumulation and 
redistribution should be observed and support 
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should be drawn from the most dynamic nuclei 
of economic power, i.e., the most highly concen-
trated and transnationalized ones (O'Donnell, 
1982; Kesselman, 1983; Hamilton, 1981). 
Actually, both these positions base their 
arguments on the strength of the existing power 
structures as a justification for their skepticism 
about the possibility of successfully implement-
ing broad and sweeping reforms. Accordingly, 
since the reformist governments are thought not 
to have sufficient power to subdue or channel the 
nuclei of State and private power opposing 
them, they should simply limit their drives for 
change to what they can actually accomplish, 
given the existing power structure, or they 
should simply abandon such efforts and bring 
their action into line with the economic and 
political logic of the system they had hoped to 
change. However, at variance with these two 
points of view, ECLAC has always believed that 
the limits of reform and the potentials of demo-
cratic planning are broader and greater than 
these criticisms would indicate. In its judgement, 
many historical experiences demonstrate that 
between conservative social engineering on a 
small scale and radical revolution there is a wide 
field, of uncertain boundaries, in which strate-
gies such as that of ECLAC can find their place 
(Maravall, 1981). 
4. The Latin American experience 
It will be enlightening to see how this last state-
ment measures up against Latin America's expe-
riences. In this connection, it may be asserted 
that the historical evolution and present nature 
of the State's functions and structure in Latin 
America are the outgrowth of the role it has 
played in economic, social and political processes 
which are first and foremost related to the con-
firmation of its internal and external power. 
Generally speaking, the nature of these pro-
cesses and the problems which they have 
entailed have caused the State to expand and 
diversify its structure in order to encompass 
increasingly broader functions. 
The core of State action in the economic 
process has consisted of laying the economic and 
political groundwork for growth and develop-
ment and furthering them through regulatory 
and productive activities. From the stage of 
outward-oriented growth onwards, through the 
various phases of industrialization, the State has 
had to expand its sphere of action because it has 
borne the main responsibility for maintaining 
these processes. 
Viewing this evolution from the standpoint 
of the productive function of the State, it may be 
seen that in the stage based on the export of 
primary products, the State supplied the specific 
infrastructure required for this pattern of 
growth (roadways, railways, ports); during the 
initial phase of industrialization, it also provided 
the general infrastructure (e.g., for energy and 
communications) and the necessary financial 
impetus; and in the later phases of industrializa-
tion, it also took charge of the basic inputs indus-
tries of relatively low market profitability (steel, 
shipbuilding, etc.). In conjunction with all of 
this, it often took on the responsibility of pro-
ducing primary products for export and of run-
ning many other productive enterprises. 
The main causes of the Latin American 
States' growing presence in the economic pro-
cess in general and in industrialization in partic-
ular have to do with the underdeveloped and 
peripheral nature of the economies and societies 
of these countries. Due to this status, local pri-
vate agents are in an intrinsically weak position 
vis-a-vis the challenges of economic growth, 
while the external agents are so powerful that 
their penetration, if unchecked, could well have 
an impact on any national State's bid for auto-
nomy. The relative weakness of the former and 
the strength of the latter within a context of 
increasing economic, financial and technological 
demands require the State to play a role of ever 
greater proportions. This situation, especially in 
the initial phases of industrialization, has been 
typical of most countries whose development 
was "delayed", including such noteworthy exam-
ples as Japan. In such cases the State has attemp-
ted to attract and/or control external agents 
while encouraging the development of the coun-
try's private sector; to this end, it has often 
initiated or promoted activity in this sector by 
offering it investment opportunities, providing 
it with financing, protecting it from outside 
competition and from internal risks, ensuring it 
a stable demand (through the use of State "pur-
chasing power"), supplying it with inexpensive 
inputs, guaranteeing its profitability, etc. While 
the underdevelopment of the periphery has 
often been marked by the weakness of the local 
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social sectors which have played a key role in the 
development of the centres (both the bourgeoi-
sie and the proletariat), it is also true that the 
State has frequently gone to considerable lengths 
to make them more vigorous. 
The State has thus strengthened the private 
sector, and this sector's vitality has, in its turn, 
served to increase the State's economic power. 
The coexistence of the State and the private 
sector has been marked by tension, however, 
since both wish to control the economic process. 
The history of Latin America contains many 
examples of the struggle between "nationalism" 
and "liberalism", between State dirigisme and 
"free enterprise", as well as of various unstable 
arrangements for the pragmatic coexistence of 
the two, ranging from that of a mixed economy 
all the way to State capitalism. 
Nevertheless, there is more involved than 
just a complex power relation between two 
rivals for supremacy which, at the same time, 
provide support to each other; another factor 
which must be taken into account is the ambival-
ent role that the State must perform in the 
development of the peripheral capitalist sys-
tems. In view of what has already been said it 
would seem to be a mistake to suppose —taking 
the viewpoint that this is a "zero sum" game— 
that any increase in State action entails a con-
comitant reduction in the private sphere; on the 
contrary, much of this increase has been neces-
sary in order for private expansion to take place. 
Furthermore, there has been a great deal of 
intermixing of the public and private sectors in 
the predominant modality of growth, and the 
cases in which this mode of growth has been the 
most successful have been based on a relatively 
stable combination of the two marked by mutual 
understanding. 
This is one side of the coin. The other con-
cerns the fact that economic growth in Latin 
America has been prone to heteronomy; the 
social and regional concentration of power, 
wealth and income; the exclusion of vast social 
groups from the benefits of growth; and the 
exacerbation of social conflict. These tendencies 
give rise to dtsequilibria which have been further 
heightened by the social and political processes 
of increasing mobilization and democratization. 
In stimulating economic growth, the State has 
had to resolve serious sectoral imbalances, just as 
it has also had to take action in relation to the 
social conflicts arising out of growth itself, out of 
the disparity between the actual amount of 
growth and the population's expectations, and 
out of the social and political demands prompted 
by mobilization and democratization. 
In essence, State action in the social process 
is primarily aimed at dealing with the difficulties 
raised by the confluence of two opposing cur-
rents: a concentrative and exclusionary eco-
nomic process, and a social process inspired by 
the principle of an equitable distribution of the 
fruits of growth. In order for it to do this, the 
State must assume the responsibility of mitigat-
ing social and regional inequalities and promot-
ing a wide-ranging social policy. 
The State has also run up against contradic-
tory tendencies in the political process. In addi-
tion to performing the classic functions relating 
to its internal and external consolidation, the 
State must, on the one hand, guarantee the oper-
ability of an institutional order whose dynamism 
spurs a growing concentrating of economic 
power and, on the other hand, not only embody a 
general rationality which overrides powerful 
individual interests, but also serve as a flexible 
institutional framework which will incorporate 
all the social forces activated by the phenomenon 
of democratization. 
These are, in a highly summarized form, the 
main economic, social and political challenges 
which the State faces. The specific ways in which 
they have been confronted have varied widely, 
as have the relative priorities assigned to 
them, but, taken as a whole, these are the 
factors that have shaped the main features of the 
anatomy and physiology of the Latin American 
States of today. These challenges have become 
more formidable in recent years due to the eco-
nomic crisis and the processes of rede moer a tiza-
tion, and the crucial question is therefore not 
whether the State should or should not intervene 
—because in fact it will do so, and on a large 
scale— but rather what should be the character-
istics of State action under the actual historical 
conditions of present-day Latin America within 
the framework of strategies aimed at democracy, 
autonomy, growth and equity. 
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III 
The building of the State 
1. Political formulas 
If the State is both the object and subject of the 
development strategy and if, as a consequence, 
the "building" of the State is one of the strategy's 
main objectives, then it is essential to define the 
type of State which is desired as well as the 
extent and intensity of its intervention in the 
economy and society. 
It is a question, in short, of taking positions 
with respect to the desired role of the State. A 
technical approach is of little use in formulating 
such positions because they are based on political 
principles; in other words, in addressing this 
issue it is not possible to arrive at optimal solu-
tions of a technical nature, but only to affirm 
positions on the basis of value judgments and 
then to try to put them into practice in concrete 
situations. The position taken in any given situa-
tion with respect to the desired role of the State 
should be based on this combination of political 
principles and real conditions. These principles 
can be organized into certain key "political for-
mulas", each of which, in turn, involves its own 
specific definition of the role of the State. 
If the State's role is seen as the pivotal issue, 
then three main "political formulas" can be iden-
tified which differ from one another as regards 
the social actors upon which they rely, the type of 
rationality which they contend should be the 
predominant one, their diagnostic analysis of the 
present crisis situation, and the route which they 
choose to take in dealing with it. 
In the liberal formula, private enterprises 
(particularly the most dynamic and productive 
ones) are the key social actors, and the predomi-
nant rationality should be that represented by 
the economic calculations of these enterprises 
and the logic of the market which serves as the 
framework for their action. In the State formula, 
the key agent is the State apparatus, and the logic 
which should prevail is the technical and politi-
cal rationality of this apparatus. Finally, in the 
democratic formula, all the social actors, both 
State and private, are regarded as important 
agents of the political and economic process 
(although emphasis is placed on the actors 
which are excluded or subordinated in the two 
preceding formulas), and the rationality which 
should guide this process should arise out of the 
interaction among them and out of a decision-
m a k i n g p roces s based on d e m o c r a t i c 
mechanisms. 
This very brief presentation of three such 
important political formulas may perhaps be 
simplistic, but its purpose is to highlight the key 
differences among them as regards the social 
actors which should ultimately lead the political 
and economic process and the type of rationality 
which should govern it. Many political controv-
ersies amount, in essence, to a difference of prin-
ciple as to the political formula considered 
desirable. 
Each of these formulas makes its own diag-
nosis of the present crisis, according to which the 
main responsibility for the crisis is attributed to 
the other political formulas, i.e., to the actors and 
types of rationalities associated with the other 
political formulas. For example, the diagnostic 
analysis of the liberal formula, which has 
received a great deal of attention in the past few 
years, identifies the main cause of the current 
crisis as being the excesses committed by States 
which are "overloaded" by the vast number of 
demands prompted and exacerbated by an 
"ungovernable" democratic process (Birch, 
1984). These phenomena are thought to have 
weakened the key social actors —the most 
dynamic private enterprises— and to have 
thwarted the economic calculations of these 
enterprises and the logic of the market as a 
mechanism, with serious consequences for 
investment, productivity, economic growth, the 
rate of inflation, political stability, etc. In much 
the same way, the remaining formulas also base 
their diagnoses of the situation on the untoward 
functioning of the others and on the effects this 
is felt to have had on the actors and the type of 
rationality which they advocate (Hearn, 1983). 
Based on the foregoing, the role which each 
political formula assigns to the State can be 
readily identified. In summary, in the liberal 
formula the primary function of the State is to 
support private agents and the market mecha-
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nism so that they can operate as well as possible. 
The State formula can be characterized as such 
because all of its advocates contend that the 
dominant rationality should be that of the State; 
but while unanimous on this point, they take 
widely varying positions on the functions which 
the State should perform. These differences are 
particularly marked as regards the desired scope 
and intensity of State regulation of private activ-
ity, its direct participation in economic activities 
and its "social" role. 
In the democratic formula, the State is seen 
as both a battlefield and a place of reconciliation 
for the interests of different social groups. In this 
sense, the State is not seen as undertaking a 
major role of its own; instead, its activity is a 
reflection of society. In this case, the State's main 
function is not to lead society but to guarantee 
the operability of democratic mechanisms 
because it is supposed that the society as a whole 
will set its own course through its use of this 
machinery. 
Each of these formulas, if considered and 
applied unilaterally, obscures and narrows the 
roles of the other actors and rationalities and, 
under these circumstances, may take an "unto-
ward" form. In reality, concrete experiences tend 
to combine elements of all three of these formu-
las, although, certainly, attempts have also been 
made throughout history to emphasize the prin-
ciples of one formula over those of the others. 
Each of these formulas focuses attention on 
some aspect of reality which must not be over-
looked in working out the role of the State in the 
current crisis. The strength of the liberal for-
mula lies in the marked concentration of private 
economic power which has occurred during the 
past few decades; in an economy founded upon 
its premises, it would be naive to ignore such 
power in view of the influence it has on the 
political and economic process, just as the factors 
on which private enterprises base their calcula-
tions —and, hence, their economic behaviour— 
cannot be changed at will. 
For these reasons, the actors and rationali-
ties of the liberal formula must play a part in any 
realistic political formula to be applied to this 
type of economic organization. It should not be 
forgotten, however, that its rationality conforms 
to the interests of its actors, which do not neces-
sarily coincide with those of society as a whole, 
and that most of these actors are transnational 
corporations which, if they were to rise to a 
predominant position, would have a direct 
impact on the level of autonomy attainable by 
the Latin American countries. Therefore, while 
it is necessary to take advantage of these enter-
prises' dynamic potential, it is just as necessary 
to regulate and control their activity so that it 
will be consistent with that of the other actors 
and rationalities. 
Similarly, the State formula is in fact based 
on a sharp increase in the power of the State. Its 
enormous influence cannot be denied, nor can 
the need for its guidance and intervention in 
societies which are becoming more and more 
economically and socially complex, which are 
marked by increasingly concentrated and trans-
nationalized private economic power, and in 
which all the social groups are becoming much 
more politically active. It is also a well-known 
fact, however, that the State is not usually guided 
by purely technical considerations and that its 
activity is often influenced by the interests of the 
very groups which form it. Thus, State actors and 
their rationality can make a very important con-
tribution, but this must also be combined with 
elements from the other formulas. 
Finally, the democratic formula would be 
justified even if for no other reason than that the 
agents and rationalities of the other formulas do 
not represent the whole of society, especially the 
social groups which make up ,the forgotten 
majority. Decisions taken as a result of the politi-
cal participation of all social groups should exert 
a decisive influence on the roles of the State and 
of the major private actors; this participation is 
now gaining momentum thanks to the stimulus 
provided by the processes of democratization. 
No one bask formula contains all the ele-
ments needed to arrive at a mixed economy, a 
desirable approach and a viable option all at the 
same time, and they must therefore be com-
bined. Indeed, history provides a highly varied 
sample of "hybrid" political formulas which mix 
the elements of the above-mentioned formulas 
together in various ways, such as those of State 
capitalism, democratic Statism, and others 
(Oszlak, 1982). The first step in addressing the 
issue of the State's role in the present crisis 
should therefore be to undertake a systematic 
examination of those hybrid political formulas 
which would be desirable and viable in the spe-
cific situations of today; furthermore, from the 
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very outset there should be a clear realization 
that, whatever the combination of elements that 
is proposed, there will inevitably be tension 
among the elements drawn from the different 
formulas (Wolfe, 1984). The resolution of this 
tension would be the highest expression of the 
political art of development, which should 
always be accompanied by a large measure of 
originality and flexibility. 
2. The desirable political formula 
In the preceding discussion an attempt has been 
made to convey the idea that any proposal for 
action designed to deal with the present crisis 
and the problems of Latin American develop-
ment should embody the contours of the political 
formula that its authors consider to be both 
desirable and viable, which will thus come to 
be both the object and subject of the proposal. 
This political formula should basically be a 
combination (whose exact make-up would vary 
as the specific situations in question change) of 
the components of the three basic formulas 
—liberal, State and democratic— since all of 
them have arguments in their favour, based on 
either fact or merit, which make it necessary to 
take them into consideration in designing such a 
formula. The role assigned to the State and the 
desired nature and scope of its economic and 
social "intervention" will depend on the political 
formula chosen and on its adaptation to the 
different national situations concerned. It has 
also been argued that, no matter what political 
formula is felt to be desirable, it will always be 
marked by tension and instability due to the fact 
that it will be a combination of heterogeneous 
and often conflicting elements drawn from the 
basic formulas; because of this, social actors 
ought to be prepared to take a flexible, undog-
matic approach within a political context in 
which an ongoing effort will be required to rec-
oncile interests and harmonize rationalities. 
On this basis, it is possible to go one step 
further and to specify a number of the features of 
the desirable political formula, taking into 
account some of the primary values which 
should guide a general strategy of action, i.e., 
autonomy, equity, democracy and stability. 
These values considerably narrow the range of 
desirable political formulas from which to 
choose and make it possible to single out some of 
the characteristics that such a formula must have 
if it is to be in keeping with these values. 
Two features are of particular importance: 
the strengthening of the State apparatus, and the 
establishment and consolidation of democratic 
forms of political organization. 
a) There are a number of reasons why it is 
necessary to strengthen the State apparatus. 
Firstly, the developmental history of the central 
and peripheral countries reveals that the State 
apparatus has expanded its functions and 
authorities the most in times of economic crisis, 
during which it is particularly necessary for a 
central power to control the disequilibria gener-
ated by the crisis and to seek a means of ending 
it; the present crisis will surely be no exception. 
Secondly, mention has already been made of 
the lack of economic, social and political integra-
tion in most of the Latin American societies, 
which are often split by deep internal divisions. 
They continue to be marked by structural hete-
rogeneity, with the attendant disparities in pro-
ductivity and income among regions and 
economic sectors, a sharp inequality of power 
and of living conditions and opportunities 
among social groups, the exclusion of some 
groups from political participation, the persist-
ence of inequalities among ethnic groups, and 
differential access to goods and services and to 
full citizenship. Consequently, feelings of 
national belonging are often weak; this sense of 
identification, which is a decisive factor in inte-
gration, especially in the "new" States, is further 
undermined by a cultural dependency which saps 
national lifestyles and forms of expression. In 
sum, the material and ideational foundations 
upon which national States are built are mani-
festly weak in these countries, and these founda-
tions must be bolstered through a process in 
which the State apparatus must play a major 
role. 
Thirdly, in the present international con-
text, trends are coming to the fore which are 
weakening the capacity to govern and reducing 
the autonomy of the governments of the peri-
pheral countries, such as the sharpening politi-
cal/military conflict between the great powers, 
the progressive transnationalization of the pro-
duction apparatuses of these countries, or the 
marked increase in their financial dependence. 
The countries can fight against these trends and 
maintain or increase their autonomy only if they 
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succeed in strengthening their State appara-
tuses, which are the only bulwark that can stem 
this tide. 
The process of strengthening the State 
apparatus should proceed along the general lines 
of the archetype of the State-as-planner devised 
by ECLAC, whose features were discussed earlier. 
This planning capacity is based on three main 
factors: technical and administrative efficiency, 
political capacity and economic/financial power. 
Increasing the technical and administrative effi-
ciency of the State apparatus is an objective with 
which all agree, provided that it is not divorced . 
from or placed above the other objectives which 
should guide the action of this apparatus. After 
many years during which Weber's model of 
bureaucratic rationality reigned unopposed over 
the processes of "administrative reform", a 
point has been reached in Latin America where 
it is clear that the type of efficiency sought 
through this model should be subordinate to the 
"social efficiency" of overall State action; this 
social effectiveness is manifested in the consis-
tency of State action with the various sorts of 
objectives which should rule its actions (Pérez 
Salgado, 1984). 
The political capacity of the State basically 
refers to its readiness to lay down obligations or 
mandates for all the social groups and to demand 
that they be fulfilled, even if it must resort to 
compulsion in order to see that this is done 
(Myrdal, 1968); however, this "strength" or 
"effectiveness" cannot be based solely or primar-
ily on the use of the coercive power associated 
with authoritarian political organizations, but 
should instead be sustained by principles which, 
in the opinion of the citizens, give legitimacy to 
such mandates. In today's Western political cul-
ture, of which the Latín American countries are a 
part, this legitimacy can only be attained through 
a reliance on democratic political principles; in 
other words, the obligations and acts of compul-
sion which will be regarded as legitimate will be 
those which a State establishes through demo-
cratic procedures. This is the only way to achieve 
the high level of individual and collective 
responsibility and discipline which should serve 
as a solid foundation for a vigorous and stable 
State political capacity. 
The economic and financial power of the 
State is closely linked to its political capacity, 
since the two buttress one another. This power is 
expressed and exercised in various ways, but its 
central element revolves around the process of 
capital accumulation; in the final analysis, the 
actual degree of such power attained in a given 
situation can be measured in terms of the capac-
ity to control this process of accumulation 
(Prebisch, 1981). This is the only way in which 
the State can put itself on an equal footing with 
private economic powers. It is difficult to decide 
which mechanisms are best suited to securing 
this power, but the most widespread are the 
appropriate control and use of economic policy 
instruments and direct productive investment; 
only the actual circumstances involved can deter-
mine what the most fitting combination of 
mechanisms will be. 
b) Within the framework of the topics dealt 
with in this article, there are three main justifica-
tions for the establishment and consolidation of 
democratic forms of political organization: the 
intrinsic value of democratic principles (Medina, 
1977), the role which democratic mechanisms 
for the articulation of interests can play in stabil-
izing and institutionalizing the political process, 
and the relation which both these factors bear to 
the objectives of social equity. 
In supporting a development strategy of a 
democratic nature, the fact should be borne in 
mind that such a strategy implies a specific way 
of solving the key problem of how to co-ordinate 
complex and politically activated societies. On 
the one hand, authoritarian decision-making 
mechanisms must be put aside, since they run 
counter to the very essence of democracy, which 
calls for broad-based participation in decision-
making. On the other hand, mechanisms of 
articulation such as the market and feelings of 
national belonging are not enough. The physical, 
economic and social integration of society is 
essential for the operation of a full democracy, 
just as the solidarity fostered by a sense of 
national identification is an important element 
in establishing and consolidating stable demo-
cratic machinery for decision-making and con-
flict resolution. However, democratic planning 
—an ideal which embodies the democratic form 
of articulation— can only be conceived of as a 
process in which all the social actors, State and 
private, participate in the co-ordinated formula-
tion and fulfilment of national objectives. 
The institutional machinery for democratic 
articulation includes, first of all, the mechanisms 
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associated with liberal democracy, which are 
based on the aggregative and representative 
function of political parties, free elections, 
parliamentary institutions and the civil and pol-
itical rights that are the foundation for this 
machinery, The obstacles standing in the way of 
a full application of such mechanisms in many 
Latin American countries, and the setbacks 
which some of them have experienced, indicate 
the difficulty of the task that lies ahead and the 
incompleteness of what has already been done, 
at the same time that the renewed strength of 
democratic movements signals the lersistence 
of these political values. 
Nonetheless, particularly in the central 
countries but in the peripheral ones as well, it 
has become evident that there are major nuclei 
of economic power whose articulation —which 
is essential for the stabilization and guidance of 
political and economic processes— has not been 
fully accomplished by means of the available 
mechanisms for socially concerting the efforts of 
these powers, which are not intended to sup-
plant the conventional ones but rather to com-
plement them (Van Klaveren, 1983)- Like the 
classic institutions of liberal democracy, these 
procedures represent a promising avenue for 
efforts to devise ways of harmonizing and con-
certing interests; however, just as the former are 
founded upon a respect for civil and political 
rights, the latter require that all social groups 
attain a considerable degree of awareness and 
organization of their interests. A process of con-
certed effort which bypasses major social groups 
is of little value. Both the classic and modern 
forms of democracy and concerted effort can be 
incomplete, limited or restricted; the objective is 
to ensure that they will be broad-based or 
comprehensive. 
Liberal-democratic mechanisms and proce-
dures for concerting efforts are not all, however, 
that is involved in the process of democratiza-
tion. The growing concentration of State and 
private power makes it necessary to search for 
ways of diffusing and controlling such power. 
The purpose of doing this is clear and has been 
underscored by many: to deepen the democrati-
zation of the State apparatus and of commercial 
enterprise, which are currently the major vehi-
cles for the concentration of economic power 
(Cardoso, 1984). If this is not done, conventional 
democratic mechanisms will be overrun and the 
process of fostering concerted efforts will bypass 
all those who are not part of these concentrated 
power structures. 
An essential pre-condition for these mecha-
nisms of democratization is the existence of a 
democratic society, i.e., a society in which there is 
an acceptance of diversity, controversy and con-
flict and, at the same time, a respect for the 
institutional machinery through which disparate 
interests are organized, expressed and influ-
enced. This machinery is no more than an empty 
shell unless it corresponds to a deep-seated social 
consensus which accords it legitimacy. Such a 
consensus constitutes the basis of the "demo-
cratic discipline" which is an indispensable com-
ponent of a State having enough authority to 
carry forward democratically-determined deci-
sions (Portantiero, 1984). 
The three dimensions of the democratiza-
tion process —democratic-liberal institutions of 
the classic sort, concerted social effort and demo-
cratic control over the main State and private 
nuclei of power— together with the social con-
sensus which is their basis, form the support 
structure for the objectives of through-going 
democratization. The fact that these elements 
constitute what is virtually a Utopian arrange-
ment should not be regarded as a reason for 
dismissing them. It is not a question of establish-
ing a fully democratic society in the short run, 
but rather of knowing what its principal forms 
are and working towards them; institutions are 
consolidated through the continuous and pro-
longed activity of men, and the only way to arrive 
at such a society is therefore by applying its 
principles as broadly and as continuously as pos-
sible. Moreover, the processes of redemocratiza-
tion now taking place in Latin America indicate 
that these objectives are headed in the right 
direction and are making viable what until 
recently seemed unattainable. 
The existence of a democratic political 
organization is also a necessary pre-condition for 
the application of a strategy for establishing 
equity (Gurrieri and Sainz, 1983). Once it is no 
longer possible to pre-suppose the assured exist-
ence of a planning and reforming State, it then 
becomes clear that without democracy there 
can be no equity, and the establishment and 
strengthening of democracy should conse-
quently be one of the priority objectives of a 
208 CEPAL REVIEW No. 31 / April 1987 
strategy of this type, especially in weak democra-
cies such as those of Latin America. This is 
particularly important during times of crisis 
such as the present, since democracy provides 
the only true rampart which the less powerful 
groups can build in order to prevent a dispropor-
tionate share of the costs of the crisis from fal-
ling upon their shoulders. 
Furthermore, the stability of democratic pol-
itical arrangements is contingent upon the 
society having passed a certain minimum 
threshold of equity. In other words, it is not 
possible to establish vigorous and stable demo-
cratic institutions in societies subject to very 
sharp economic, ethnic, social and cultural 
inequality. It can therefore be argued that equity 
and democracy are mutually reinforcing and con-
stitute two virtually inseparable aspects of the 
overall strategy. 
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